SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY MONMOUTH COUNTY

LAW DIVISION - CIVIL PART DOCKET NO.: MON-L-1169-07

BARBARA BAUER, et als.,

Plaintiffs

TRANSCRIPT

-vs-

JENNA GLATZER, et als.,

OF

DECISION

Defendants

Held at: Monmouth County Courthouse

71 Monument Park

Freehold, New Jersey 07728

Heard on: September 19, 2008

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE BETTE E. UHRMACHER, J.S.C.

TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY:

GRAYSON BARBER, ESQ.

APPEARANCES:

GREGORY LUDWIG, Pro Se (Telephonically)

Audio Operator:

Wendy Brodsky

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PAGE DECISION Ludwig motion 3 Narayan motion 12 Decision 3 THE COURT: Barbara Bauer and Barbara Bauer Literary Agency, Inc. versus Jenna Glatzer. This is Docket Number L-1169-07. These are two decisions on motions for summary judgment which the Court heard on September 12th, 2008 and reserved until today, because

the Court was ill on the 12th and did not feel it could render its decisions.

I'm going to start with the motion for summary judgment brought by Gregory Ludwig. Mr. Ludwig is available by phone, and anyone else who is interested is here in court. Defendant Gregory Ludwig applied for summary judgment -- hold on.

(Court and clerk confer) (tape off - tape on)

THE COURT: As I indicated, defendant Gregory Ludwig applied for summary judgment against plaintiff Barbara Bauer and Barbara Bauer Literary Agency, hereafter plaintiffs. Defendant Ludwig is pro se. There is a case management conference scheduled for November its discovery ends in December. 13, 2008,

Movant Ludwig refers to the claims in the second amendment complaint, which we'll now call the SAC, and he primarily appears in Counts 37 and 38 of the SAC. Mr. Ludwig indicates that plaintiff alleges a malicious conspiracy of defamation and tortious interference with

 prospective economic advantage. Movant does not, alleges he doesn't own the website webusers.warwick.net at which various comments were posted, but is responsible for being the author of a word document which can be found at website webusers.warwick.net and is referred to as bauerdefense.doc.

The document is, according to the movant, a type of file transfer protocol, meaning it can be accessed using a universal resource locator, a URL, or is located on a phone company server. In other words, the document can be viewed and copied to an individual user's hard drive by typing in the specific URL. But the document cannot be accessed on the internet the way a typical website would work. The file transfer protocol, according to movant, is a free service of the phone company and he doesn't have to pay a fee for it.

And movant argues that his website can be found using search websites because it's directly linked to them, and he gives a web address. Movant has, indicates he has no control over the linking of any of his writing to the various pages, and therefore he's alleging that that which he wrote is not defamatory. The way other people used it or posted it or act in regard to it is not anything he's responsible for.

Mr. Ludwig claims that the wording alleged in

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the second amendment complaint is not the wording in his document. The wording of the phrase in the second amended complaint, "Barbara Bauer, a scammer" he alleges has been changed several times between August 19th, 2006 and March 2nd, 2007. Mr. Ludwig does claim that between those dates the same headline has been present on any version of the website that can be viewed.

Barbara Bauer a scammer? What about a writer's voice? What about the issue of restraint of trade? That is his original document and the document really that's at issue here. Search of the alleged subheading Barbara Bauer a scammer, does not always end up in the first page of results, as is alleged by the plaintiff. When a search did reveal the document, it was phrased with a question mark at times, at other times it was not.

As background, movant and plaintiff contracted together for a period of seven years. Mr. Ludwig is a writer who is trying to publish books, and the plaintiff is a literary agent who places authors for publication of books. According to Mr. Ludwig, he supplied Ms. Bauer with 12 book manuscripts, none of which actually were published, and he paid a fee for those actions.

Movant began writing blog entries pertaining to Ms. Bauer beginning on September 5th, 2006 which included discussion about their past business interactions. That's

 not alleged to be defamatory. It is plaintiff -Mr. Ludwig provided his response which is
referred to by Mr. Ludwig as "Bauerdefense.doc", and that
was posted on his blog on August 30th. Mr. Ludwig
notified Ms. Bauer of that document and there was a
response from Ms. Bauer thanking him for his defense.
The problem is that movant also notified co-defendant
Strauss, who is the blog administrator, of the
Bauerdefense.doc.

And co-defendant Strauss indicated in her blog on September 1st, 2006 that she was aware of Bauerdefense.doc. And there were communications back and forth between Ludwig and Strauss indicating Ms. Strauss was being critical of Mr. Ludwig, which according to Mr. Ludwig shows there's not a conspiracy but rather there was a complete disagreement about how they viewed Ms. Bauer.

On September 5th, 2006, as I indicated, Mr. Ludwig emailed Ms. Strauss that Mr. Ludwig had changed the content of Bauerdefense.doc, and Ms. Strauss indicated she was aware of the document. In the summer of 2006 Mr. Ludwig and Ms. Bauer were in communications concerning the derogatory comments on the internet about the plaintiff and Mr. Ludwig's distress at that turn of events. And those emails have been provided to the

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Court.

Before the blog entry and associated comments were made in August of 2006, plaintiff Ms. Bauer and Mr. Ludwig communicated about these negative comments. And according to Mr. Ludwig, nothing in the blog in 2006 could be interpreted by the plaintiff as malicious. In fact, her reaction was quite the contrary, as I indicated.

In December 2007 Mr. Ludwig made blog comments having to do with an author's death, someone with whom the plaintiff had an association. The blog discussion was with Ms. Strauss. Movant claims in comments in January of '08 that nothing there had any relationship to the plaintiff.

Now the plaintiff, after receiving all these allegations and statements of fact by Mr. Ludwig, indicated that in her first complaint there were 17 separate individuals who were alleged to be part of this conspiracy of defamation and tortious interference. She then filed a second amended complaint, adding three more. And that's where Mr. Ludwig was included as a defendant.

As we've indicated, this is a motion for summary judgment, and Ms. Bauer and her agency argue that there are material questions of fact and that those have to do with the nature of the words used by Mr. Ludwig,

Barbara Bauer a scammer. According to the plaintiff that is clearly capable of a defamatory meaning with or without the question mark, and that a search of the internet reveals his article under Barbara Bauer a scammer. And therefore, it clearly has a defamatory meaning and, in the light most favorable to a nonmoving party in a summary judgment action, that this Court should deny summary judgment.

Mr. Ludwig argues that pursuant to the statute NJSA 2A:43-2, that a defendant may give proof of intention, and plaintiff, unless he shall prove either malice in fact or that defendant, after having been requested by plaintiff in writing to retract the libelous charge in as public a manner as that in which it was made, failed to do so within a reasonable time, shall recover only his actual damage proved and specially alleged in the complaint.

Mr. Ludwig alleges there's no malice shown here and there was never a request for him to retract what is in essence, according to Mr. Ludwig, a defense of Ms. Bauer. There's no allegation of actual damages.

The Court doesn't feel it needs to reach those issues. The real question is, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party in this case, under the standards of <u>Brill versus Guardian Life Insurance</u>

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<u>Company</u>, 142 New Jersey 520 (1995) and the requirements of the rule under summary judgment, are these exchanges by Mr. Ludwig defamatory or capable of a defamatory meaning.

Now, Mr. Ludwig argues that in deciding whether these alleged comments are defamatory or what they actually mean, that that is to be left to the Court to consider in consideration of the content, verifiability and context of challenged statements, and cites Ward versus Zelikovsky, 136 New Jersey 516 at 529 (1994). Courts need to look at the plain meaning of the words (fair and natural meaning) given by a reasonable person, and all the words in the statement must be taken into account. That's Ward Super at 529. Also see Wilson versus Grant, 297 New Jersey Super 128 at 136 (App. Division. 1996).

The plaintiff argues that under <u>Romaine versus</u> <u>Kallinger</u>, 109 New Jersey 282 (1988), the standard in a defamation case is whether it is "capable of being assigned more than one meaning, one of which is defamatory and another not. The question of whether the content is defamatory is one that must be resolved by the trier of fact." That's indicating because the plaintiff believes there are material of issues of facts that this issue should go to the ultimate trier of fact, that is

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the jury.

Plaintiff argues that the use, whether with our without the question mark as I indicated before, is defamatory or could be considered defamatory, and argues that we're not talking about an actual malice standard but rather a negligence standard, citing Turf Lawnmower Repair versus Bergen Record Corp., 139 New Jersey 392 at 412 (1955).

Mr. Ludwig, in opposition, indicates that the plaintiff hasn't really presented any facts that show that what he has stated is derogatory and defamatory, or that he was in any way part of the Google bombing which took place after the first complaint was filed, and that he should be granted summary judgment.

This Court is aware of <u>Turf Lawnmower Repair</u> versus <u>Bergen Record</u>, and should first indicate what the standard is for this defamation case. I find that there is not an actual malice standard. Ms. Bauer and her agency are not public officials. This is not a matter of public concern in the normal context. This is a private matter that was made public because the internet was involved. But by doing that, I find it doesn't make it a matter of public concern.

There are always free speech issues involved in a defamation case, but that doesn't take it out of the

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So under <u>Turf Lawnmower Repair versus Bergen</u>

Even though part of the

general negligence area.

 malice standard. Nonetheless, the Court is granting summary judgment under the negligence standard to Mr. Ludwig pursuant to Rule 4:46-2, that Mr. Ludwig placed in the record a number of articles or statements that were placed on the internet. And when they are read in context, content and context, it appears that there is no defamatory meaning which can be implied. And in fact, the response by the plaintiff indicates that she did not imply a defamatory meaning.

In fact, Mr. Ludwig is castigated by those with

information was in a Wikipedia article, that's already

Record, this Court finds that there's not an actual

been the subject, I believe, of a prior motion.

whom he corresponds in the normal course for his defense of Ms. Bauer. I find that the certification by the plaintiff did not negative (sic) any of the allegations put forth by Mr. Ludwig, that there was -- if one considers the content and context of the statements, they could not and do not indicate a defamatory meaning.

There was clearly no actual malice and there was not a negligent defamation as the Court views the documents, and therefore summary judgment is granted in the defendant Ludwig's favor and an order will be issued

today.

Mr. Ludwig, that's all that we will need from you. And so I was going to hang up now.

MR. LUDWIG: Okay, thank you.

THE COURT: You're welcome. Would you just check and see who else wanted to be phoned in. Off the record.

(tape off - tape on)

THE COURT: All right. The person who wanted to call in represents some other of the defendants and we weren't aware -- the Court wasn't aware, my secretary apparently was aware that he wanted to, and we haven't done it by conference, so he will have to order the transcript, unfortunately.

The next motion for summary judgment is based on lack of personal jurisdiction on behalf of defendant Shweta Narayan. And this also was brought before the Court on September 12th, 2008. The Court did not give its decision at that time because the Court was ill, heard argument, and the Court incorporates into both these decisions, the comments of counsel and the Court on September 12th, as well as the opinion read into the record today, September 19th. Both these were of course opposed.

The second motion for summary judgment arises

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out of alleged defamatory internet postings on a website, AbsoluteWrite.com, and that will be referred to as AW. Although that isn't really addressed in the second amended complaint.

The allegations in the second amended complaint against Ms. Narayan have to do with, particularly in paragraph 3, that in or about November of 2006 defendant Narayan published a paper in abstract which contained numerous, false, and defamatory statements about the plaintiffs, that she had a public talk at the University of California, that the false and defamatory statements were made maliciously with the intent to destroy, alleges contact with New Jersey, but doesn't talk about the website on which these matters were posted. In fact, they apparently were posted in an internet chat room where Ms. Narayan is a regular contributor, this AbsoluteWrite.com.

But as I indicated, the second amended complaint speaks in Counts 33 and 34 only of the paper or the presentation that was made at the University of California, San Diego. And that alleges that, as I indicated, on January 31st, 2008, that's the second amended complaint, alleges that Ms. Narayan defamed the plaintiffs and tortiously interfered with plaintiff's prospective economic advantage by displaying defamatory

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statements in an academic paper entitled the Evolving Parodies of Barbara Bauer. And this was presented at the Conceptual Structure Discourse and Language Conference at the University of California, San Diego on November 4th, 2006.

Plaintiff's counsel included a slide from Ms. Narayan's academic conference presentation, and those slides contain bullet point statements such as; AW spreads information about scams, which is why it was attacked, Barbara Bauer known scam literary agent. slides and Ms. Narayan's presentation were accessible via AW's website and the UCSD website.

The plaintiff sent a cease and desist letter to UCSD chancellor Marianne Fox and to the secretary of the regents dated February 28th, 2007 and March 1st, 2007. Those are provided to the Court, and I received a notice that these matters were being pulled from the UCSD website.

Counts 41 and 42 allege that Ms. Narayan conspired with her co-defendants to defame and tortiously interfere with plaintiff's prospective economic advantage, particularly plaintiff's claim that Narayan is a moderator of AW and that the remark, Bauer is a scam artist, is clearly defamatory and was on Ms. Narayan's As I indicated, although these matters are alleged

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now, they are not part of the second amended complaint. Ms. Narayan argues that the alleged defamatory remarks were never intended or targeted to have an affect in New Jersey, that those arose in the context of a linguistics academic abstract which featured the alleged defamatory remarks arising out of an incident involving Ms. Bauer and the AW website, and used it as a "linguistics model to study how each of these parodies has a different point, each creating a different blended linguistic structure profiling different aspects of the chatter's knowledge."

In turn, Ms. Narayan proceeds to briefly describe each of the three parodies in her presentation. It quotes a specific scenario allegedly from the chat room, in which a guest posing as Ms. Bauer claims to be a real literary agent while agreeing to represent chatter's without looking at their work. That was Exhibit A at plaintiff's opposition brief.

Therefore, making a presentation at an academic conference, according to the defendant Narayan, does not satisfy the minimum sufficient contact for purposes of in personam jurisdiction. So this summary judgment was filed by defendant to determine whether there is in personam jurisdiction in this California resident who has alleged no context, property, or otherwise with the forum

State of New Jersey.

Plaintiff has filed, as I indicated, an opposing brief arguing that there are genuine issues of material fact which exist concerning whether the defendant's comments were defamatory.

The standard to be applied again on a motion for summary judgment is set forth in <u>Brill versus</u> <u>Guardian Life Insurance Company</u>, 142 New Jersey 520 (1955). When deciding a motion for summary judgment under Rule 4:46-2, the motion judge must consider whether the competent evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, are sufficient to permit a rational fact finder to resolve the alleged disputed issues in favor of the nonmoving party, id at 523.

Under the <u>Brill</u> standard the Court determines whether the evidence presents sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury, or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Applying this standard the Court makes the findings of facts and conclusions of law.

The plaintiff Barbara Bauer is a New Jersey resident and lives at 179 Washington Avenue, Matawan, New Jersey 07747. The defendant Shweta Narayan is a California resident presently living in San Diego,

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California. Parenthetically, when she was served she was not served at the address that plaintiff believed she lived at, but rather service was hand delivered to her by her brother and sister-in-law. But she actually did receive service and she replied. She answered. That was before the appointment of a pro bono counsel via The Electronic Frontier Foundation. And I find all those facts.

Defendant has never lived or owned property in New Jersey and alleges that she traveled through New Jersey before the age of 15. During the relevant time period defendant was a linguistics graduate student at UC Berkeley.

Defendant presented an abstract paper for a Linguistics Academic Conference, CSDL, at the University of California, San Diego on November 4th, 2006. Thirty to 40 people attended. In that presentation defendant displayed slides that allegedly contained defamatory statements. Although Ms. Narayan has written a paper that was to be published, it has not been published, and that was a paper based on this linguistic study. That same presentation that was made at UCSD was published on the defendant's blog, the AW website, and the UCSD website.

This case arises, raises, I'm sorry, the in

personam jurisdiction question in the context of internet defamation litigation, and it turns on whether defendant Narayan's academic presentation of the alleged defamatory remarks at the conference, even though not pled on her blog and on the other websites, established sufficient minimum contact with the forum state and were intended to injure the plaintiff in the forum state.

State court long-arm in personam jurisdiction reaches non-residents through either general or specific jurisdiction. General jurisdiction lies where a state exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant's contact with the forum. But it requires continuous contact, which we do not have here.

Specific jurisdiction lies where a state exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant's activities in or contacts with the forum state. <u>Lebel versus Everglades Marina Inc.</u>, 150 New Jersey 317. And New Jersey recognizes both forms of jurisdiction, but here we are only dealing with specific jurisdiction.

The next issue the Court has to determine is whether the defendant's connection with the forum state, New Jersey, meets the minimum contact requirements necessary to fulfill in personam jurisdiction.

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New Jersey permits in personam jurisdiction over a defendant only if the defendant has "certain minimum contacts" with the forum such that the maintenance of this suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. That was first enunciated in <u>International Shoe versus Washington</u>, 326 U.S. 310 at 316 (1945).

The minimum contacts threshold shields defendants from an arbitrary or fundamentally unfair imposition of a state's jurisdiction. Allstate Insurance Company versus Hague, 449 U.S. 302 at 312-13 (1981). In determining whether the minimum contacts requirement has been satisfied, the Court must decide if the defendant's contact with the forum resulted from her purposeful conduct and not the unilateral activities of the plaintiff. That's World-Wide Volkswagen versus Woodson, 44 U.S. 286 at 297-98, a 1980 case.

The purposeful availment requirement protects the defendant from being snatched by "a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts." <u>Burger King Corp. versus Rudzewicz</u>, 671 U.S. 462 at 475 (1985).

The Court adopted this, New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the purposeful availment requirement as a minimum contacts gauge to measure the nature and quality

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of a defendant's contacts with the State of New Jersey, That was Blakey versus Continental the forum state. Airlines Inc., 164 New Jersey 38 (2000.)

In conjunction with purposeful availment, the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen had held that "the defendant's conduct and contact with the forum state must be such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled That's World-Wide at 297. Therefore, into court there." to confer in personam jurisdiction over a defendant under the minimum contacts requirement, there must be "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of the Hanson versus Denckla at 357 U.S. 235 (1958).

The impermissible extent of a state's personal jurisdiction in the internet context is illustrated by the Federal case of Zippo Manufacturing Company versus Zippo Dot Com, 952 Fed. Supp. 1119 (Western District of Pennsylvania 1997). In that case the plaintiff lighter company filed a trademark infringement for delusion of its name Zippo and arquing that this internet company should not be using it.

The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff was based in Pennsylvania, the defendant in California, and

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had no offices, agencies or employees in Pennsylvania. The defendant's contact with Pennsylvania occurred over the internet. Approximately 3,000 Pennsylvania residents paid defendant Zippo Dot Com a subscriber's fee by credit card over the internet. Further, the defendant entered into agreements with seven internet access providers in Pennsylvania to provide access to Pennsylvania subscribers.

The Court concluded that the defendant's engagement in electronic commerce with Pennsylvania residents constituted purposeful conduct under the sufficient minimum contacts test. Id at 1125-26. the Zippo District Court proposition is that sufficient minimum contact is made where the non-resident makes an effort to establish business connections with the resident in the forum state.

The second prong is whether conferring jurisdictional authority violates notions of fair play and substantial justice, which triggered the factors that were enunciated in a Asahi Metal Industry Company Limited versus Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 at 107 (1987).

In that case, this was a foreign company doing business in the United States and the Court said that the factors which should be analyzed are, 1) the burden on

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the defendant, 2) the interest of the forum state, 3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief and, 4) the interstate judicial system's interest in efficient resolution of disputes and the shared interest of the states, and furthering fundamental substantive social This was also cited in <u>Lebel Supra</u> at 317. policies.

In Lebel, the plaintiff New Jersey resident purchased a luxury cigarette racing boat from a company in Florida and arranged for it to be delivered. damaged on route. Plaintiff filed suit in New Jersey for compensation, and the defendant there moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court determined that the burden on the defendant boat company to litigate in New Jersey did not outweigh the burden on the plaintiff to litigate in Florida.

Moreover, the defendant failed to prove that it was unable to present any evidence in New Jersey that would have been available in Florida. And the Court concluded that New Jersey had a legitimate interest in a contract fraud case to protect its creditor. The Court contrasted the situation in Asahi, because there the Asian company would have to cross the Pacific Ocean to defend itself in California, and had to contend with a foreign legal system, and therefore it was not permitted.

However, the ubiquity of information access and

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sharing on the internet, and the open-ended nature of internet communications each posed challenges to the in personam jurisdiction framework. The New Jersey Supreme Court first addressed this in the Blakey versus Continental Airlines case, 164 New Jersey, particularly at 52 and 54. It's a 2000 case.

The Court found that where "an intentional act calculated to create an actional event in a forum state will give that state jurisdiction over the actor." See also Waste Management Inc. versus Admiral, 138 New Jersey 106 at 122 (1994). Put simply, a state could exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant if the defendant "expected or intended to cause injury in New Jersey." The Court noted further that the means of communication was not as important as the quality or nature of the contact with the forum state.

In a case which directly comments on an internet defamation, see Goldhaber versus Kohlenberg, it's an Appellate Division case, 395 New Jersey Super 380 (Appellate Division 2007). In that case plaintiffs and defendant were members of an internet news group. plaintiffs were New Jersey residents, the defendant a California resident who had no contact of any kind with New Jersey.

In January of '03 the defendant posted a series

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of defamatory messages about the plaintiffs, and they asserted that the plaintiffs engaged in bestiality, incest, and made cruel references to the plaintiff's hearing infirmity, commented on where it is that the plaintiffs lived, their local government, their police department, their neighbors. They listed the address.

Thus, the defendant not only knew the plaintiffs resided in New Jersey, but his comments were also targeted at New Jersey. Conduct of this nature and its connection to New Jersey were such that the defendant reasonably should have anticipated being haled into New Jersey court, according to the appellate court at 13. Therefore, in personam jurisdiction would lie over that defendant, not resident.

Here, but for its citation to the plaintiff's website in a footnote, there is no indication that this defendant Narayan had any connection to New Jersey. The question then is whether defendant Narayan's conduct resulted in sufficient minimum contacts with New Jersey such that she purposely created contact with New Jersey by publishing an academic presentation featuring allegedly defamatory comments in California, and whether she reasonably anticipated being haled into New Jersey Superior Court, whether it would be fair to permit it.

Construing the facts in the favor of the

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plaintiff, the nonmoving party, the record still illustrates that the defendant featured allegedly defamatory comments as part of a linguistics academic paper delivered in California to 30 or 40 people. The focus was the study of a parody of communications which occurred on the internet. Certainly the plaintiff's name was mentioned as a scammer in one part of the presentation.

Even if the defendant disdained the plaintiff and was angry because she believed that the AW website was cut off as a result of Ms. Bauer's actions, that is not what occurred during this linguistics presentation. That in no way brought her action within New Jersey. Now the question then is what about listing this slide show on her website, on UCSDS's website, and AW's website.

Crucial is the fact that the defendant did not

Crucial is the fact that the defendant did not simply prepare a paper but, as alleged although not pled in the complaint, did list this so that it was available in certain chat rooms. The posting of the academic paper after presenting it at a conference illustrates only the wanting to share this linguistics paper. What it is that Ms. Narayan said is, hey everyone, I posted my academic presentation to show my allegiance against Barbara Bauer, a real scam artist.

So according to the plaintiff, that was

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sufficient to show that she had a defamatory motive and that it was not just a legitimate linguists conference. Although plaintiff, in her counter statement alleges that defendant is a ringleader of this defamation and Google bombing, there really is no fact to support it other than that one statement where she indicated I posted this academic paper.

Although the plaintiff takes these defamatory statements out of context, I find that that statement was not out of context. Nonetheless, it was a linguistics paper delivered in California for a limited audience, placed on a chat room with a limited academic circulation. And the Court finds that, in its analysis, that there are not sufficient minimum contacts to bring this matter within New Jersey.

The Court finds that dropping a footnote with the plaintiff's website, wherein the plaintiff happened to list her address, is in no way a <u>Goldhaber</u> kind of situation where the writer on the website targets New Jersey and the specific community, and makes allegations about this area of New Jersey and the police, etcetera. In sharp contrast, New Jersey is not mentioned anywhere in any of the presentations. There is no direct linking with New Jersey. There is nothing indicating that there are any efforts to contact in New Jersey.

In analyzing whether there was an intention to cause injury in New Jersey under the affects test, as the New Jersey State Supreme Court noted in <u>Blakey</u>, the communicative means of delivering the message is subordinate to the nature and quality of the contact. Again, unlike the defendant in <u>Goldhaber</u>, the defendant in this case did not make any direct or specific reference to any place in New Jersey. The slides are destitute of any mention of the address. The dropping of a website footnote doesn't mean that it would go back necessarily to a person's name and address. The plaintiff happens, because of her business, to have her address as part of her website.

But this is in such sharp contrast to <u>Goldhaber</u> that the Court finds that under the affects test in personam jurisdiction does not lie over this defendant. As I indicated, the Court finds there are not sufficient minimum contacts in which to permit in personam jurisdiction, and therefore the motion for summary judgment of defendant Narayan is granted and the Court will send out orders. Off the record.

CERTIFICATION

I, SUSAN WALSH, Certified Agency Transcriber, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings on copied Tape No. CV 0017-08 Index 0044 to 2599, is prepared in full compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial Proceedings and is a true and accurate compressed transcript of the decision as recorded in the matter of BAUER ET ALS vs. GLATZER ET ALS heard by the Monmouth County Superior Court on September 19, 2008.

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